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ABSTRACT

Heidegger's
difficult

essay "The Origin of the Work of Art" contains

and often ambiguous

clarify Heidegger's

is that a thin .g's meaning in relation

The disclosure

reveals

is dependent

Equipment , science , technology,
determine

whether

Heideggerian

of truth requires an encounter

which allows

The possibility

upon the establishing

of certain

and language

of our being
conditions.

are investigated

or not they are able to establish

which are necessary for the disclosure of truth.

The

to our existence

about us constitutes

things to direct us as to what they are .
directed

The discussion begins

of what Heidegger means by truth.

and what that meaning
truth.

This thesis attempts to

thoughts on works of art.

with an examination
determination

concepts .

the conditions

The conclusion is

that they are not because they fall victim to our directives
encounter them .
establish
things.

to

when we

Works of art are those things which are able to

the necessary

conditions

for a proper

encounter

with

Since things other than works of art are subject to our

directives,

artworks have become the only things which are able to

disclose truth.

This claim finds support through analysis of

Heidegger's works "The Origin of the Work of Art", "The Essence of
Truth" , and "The Question Concerning Technology"
critical

examination

of commentaries

11

and through a

on those works.
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PREFACE

This text attempts

to prove that Heidegger

understands

works

of art as being the only things which are able to disclose truth.
Heidegger's

Since

essay "The Origin of the Work of Art" is often ambiguous ,

his essays "On the Essence of Truth" and "The Question Concerning
Technology"

are explored to help clarify his thought on works of art.

I attempt to explain Heideggerian
living.

The discussion

it is attainable

of truth then moves to an explanation

during our encounters

understanding

with things.

of truth is not grounded

of truth which determine
utility .

truth in terms of existence ,

truth through

Since Heideggerian

object , it becomes

necessary

such an encounter

becomes

Heidegger's

in the leading

interpretations

observation , sensation,

truth requires
to establish

of how

that we be directed
the conditions

or
by the

under which

possible.

Before claiming that works of art are the only things which
provide

for a proper encounter

with things, an encounter

we are directed by the thing, it was necessary
other than works of art do not provide
Equipment,

science,

of the conditions
the examination
during

to explain why things

a proper encounter .

technology , and language

necessary for the disclosure

are evaluated
of truth .

encounters

m terms

The result of

is that each falls victim to our directives

our common

in which

of will

with them.

Works of art, however , remove us from our common encounter
with things.

Thus removed , we are free to be directed by things .

Works of art thereby become the only things which disclose
IV

truth.

The discussion of the artwork includes an explanation of how works
are able to achieve the conditions necessary
truth.

Throughout

my discussion , I have attempted

of the ambiguity of Heidegger's
successful

for the disclosure

thought.

in my attempts.

V

of

to dissolve some

I hope that I have been

4
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INTRODUCTION

Traditional
understand

attempts

at defining

as works of fine art.

art have been evaluated

beauty

through

The standards by which works of

its subject, the work 's ability to

color combinations

and the artist's originality of expression.
of Art" 1

and line configurations ,
In "The Origin of the Work

Heidegger breaks with the tradition:

in terms of truth.

only what we

include , but are not limited to, the accuracy

with which the work represents
display

art consider

For Heidegger,

his essay redefines

art

works of art are those things that

reveal truth; in fact, artworks are the only things that are able to
bring forth truth.

In order to understand

Heidegger's

thought on art ,

"The Origin of the Work of Art" should be read in conjunction with
his essays "On the Essence of Truth" 2 and "The Question Concerning
Technology"
understanding

. 3 Read as a trilogy , the essays clarify Heidegger's
of truth and why this understanding

is disclosed

only

m works of art.
For Heidegger , truth is dependent
Experiencing

truth requires

upon our expenencmg

that we move out of our everyday

it.
way

Martin Heidegger , "The Origin of the Work of Art ," in Martin
Heidegger
Basic Writing s, ed. by David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper & Row ,
Publishers , 1977) pp. 149-187.
All future references to this essay will be cited
within the text.
2
Martin Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth ," in Martin Heidegger Basic
Writings,
ed . by David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper & Row , Publishers ,
1977) pp . 117-141.
All future references to this essay will be cited within the
text.
3
Martin Heidegger , "The Question Concerning Technology ," in Martin
Heidegger Basic Writings, ed. by David Farrell Krell (New York : Harper & Row ,
All future references to this essay will be cited
Publishers, 1977) pp . 287-317.
within the text .

2
of v1ewmg things and into an open region of relatedness
In this open relatedness
forcing our directives

we become directed by the thing instead of

upon it.

In order to receive the thing's

directives,

we must engage the object with a receptive

responsive

state of mind and move into its truth.

encounter

requires

that we respond

becomes

a co-respondence

response

is actually a co-respondence

relatedness

between

with them.

between

ourselves

and

Since the

to the directives

given, truth

things and ourselves.

Our

because it is grounded in the

and the thing.

Thus, truth depends

on our letting the thing be the thing that it is, i.e. , viewing the thing
as something independent

from us yet related to us.

Part of what a

thing is includes how it exists or functions in relation to us.
Therefore,

the truth that we experience

is not just a truth of the

thing, but it is also a truth of ourselves .
Things , equipment,
conditions

necessary

and technology

for experiencing

each of these is preconditioned
for us.

Consequently,

relatedness
Instead,

truth.

Our approach

and predetermined

and technology

and utilizing.

The event of truth, therefore,

equipment,

or technology.
associates

surrender

by them.
to our

In such cases, we provide the

directives.

Heidegger

toward

we are unable to enter into an open

equipment,

of controlling

the

by their utility

with them where we might be directed

things,

directives

disable us from meeting

cannot happen with things,

truth with language.

For Heidegger ,

language is able to reveal truth when it reflects its origin.

Language,

however, has fallen victim to the technicity

and utility which lay

claim to things, equipment,

we utilize language to

and technology;
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make clear our directives.

Consequently , language is only able to

reveal truth when it is poetic, thereby making it an artwork.
the artwork becomes

Thus ,

the only thing in which truth happens.

Heidegger

sees works of art as those created things which are

successful

m bringing

createdness.

forth the event of truth through their

Such created things achieve this by removing

our everyday way of viewing things.
be directed by things.
relatedness,
happening

enabling

us from

Thus removed, we are able to

The artwork opens a region of open
us to meet the conditions

necessary

for the

of truth.

Heidegger's

redefining

of art calls for a re-evaluation

works which we have come to view as works of art.
not understand

artworks as being restricted

of the

Heidegger does

to the fine arts.

In fact,

he may argue that some of the works which fall under this category
are not really works of art at all because they do not bring about the
event of truth.

The theory's unwillingness

neatly clouds discussion

and evaluation

to categorize

of the theory itself.

For this reason, we need to explain Heidegger's
and to establish

the conditions

artwork is.

views of truth

under which truth becomes

Our purpose is not to evaluate Heidegger's
understand

artworks

it so that we may determine

accessible.

notion of truth but to
what a true Heideggerian

Next , we must examine why things other than works of

art , specifically

equipment

and technology,

necessary for the event of truth.
come to an understanding

fail to meet the conditions

Finally, it is important that we

of how artworks are able to disclose truth

in order to distinguish them as works of art.

Only after this

4

accomplishment

can we understand

means of disclosing

truth.

why artworks

are the only

5

I. TRUTH

At the closure of "On the Essence of Truth", Heidegger explains
that "the course of the questioning
of a thinking
concepts,

transform

our everyday

aggressive
encounter.
responsive

approach

141)

relationship

Truth therefore
with things.

whereby we force our directives

and
of its
that we

Heidegger

views

and

upon the things that we

Truth, by contrast, calls for a contemplative
encounter

the way

requires

toward things as being insistent

and

wherein we let the thing direct us as to what it

Truth is experienced;

it is our entering into a relatedness

thing we are encountering.
discoverer

representations

and tries itself as a transformation

to Being."(Truth,

our common

1s.

which , instead of furnishing

experiences

relatedness

[of truth] is intrinsically

m this relatedness

The participation
leads Heidegger

with the

of the thing and of the
to describe truth as an

event.
Truth depends
thing .

Heidegger

into accordance

upon our entering

explains the possibility

into agreement

with the

of our bringing ourselves

with the thing in the following passage:

What is stated by the presentative statement 1s said of the
presented thing in just such manner as that thing, as presented,
is. The "such as" has to do with the presenting and its
presented.
Disregarding all "psychological" preconceptions as
well as those of any "theory of consciousness ," to present
here means to let the thing stand opposed as object. As
thus placed , what stands opposed must traverse an open field
of opposedness [Entgegen] and nevertheless must maintain its
stand as a thing and show itself as something withstanding [ein
Standiges].
This appearing of the thing in traversing a field of
opposedness takes place within an open region, the openness of
which is not first created by the presenting but rather is only
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entered into and taken over as a domain of relatedness.
The
relation of the presentative statement to the thing is the
accomplishment of that bearing [Verhaltnis] which originally
and always comes to prevail as a comportment [Verhalten].
(Truth, 123 & 124)
It is not clear what is happening

when the thing stands opposed as

object, traverses an open field of opposedness,
something

withstanding.

For Heidegger,

exists within an open region.
present in the open region.

and shows itself as

everything

Therefore,

is present

or

we and the thing are

It is only in an open region that we are

able to encounter and engage with things.

The open region is that

place where the object is able to stand as an independent

thing, and

we are able to recognize it as such and consider our relationship
it.

with

It is a clearing in that we are removed from our everyday

perspective
possibility

of the object; thus, the open region establishes

the

for the object to stand opposed as object.

To let the thing stand opposed as object is to acknowledge
something

which exists independent

of ourselves.

In order to do

this, we must resist forcing ourselves upon the thing.
refraining

from prejudgements,

a preconditioned

of utility, and any other self-imposing

disposition.

able to traverse the open field of opposedness.
twofold.

This means

examination,

ideas

The thing is then
This traversing

is

It includes the thing projecting itself as object; yet, the

Heideggerian

notion

of truth involves

between us and the thing.
frustrating

it as

relatedness

The thing's traversing

of the field of opposedness.

as an object which is independent

or co-respondence
also entails a

That is, the thing must stand

of ourselves yet related to us.

7

These

conditions

establish

establishing

the possibility

participate

in and respond

requires

that we reflect

we respond

thing.

according

Perspective

the possibility

of openness.

of truth by

Openness

to the relatedness.

Such involvement

upon what is presented.
to the particular

occurs when we

Truth requires

perspective

the

guides

cannot refer to our point of viewing the thing, for

that would be the perspective
positioning

in relation

Heidegger

is referring.

which guides us.

So, our physical

to the thing is not the perspective

to which

Objects are unable to have a point of view, at

least, not in the sense that we understand

it.

The particular

perspective

of the thing must refer to its relationship

relationship

is not constituted

encounter

which

that

with it, for physical

by its physical
positioning

to us, but this

positioning

during

our

cannot guide the thing.

Thus, we must look for what guides the thing as it exists.
The physical
something

properties

the thing that it is.

of a thing seem secondary
If we take Heidegger's

to making

example of a

coin (Truth, 122 & 123), we can say that it is round and made of
metal.

This description,

however,

charm or a metal paper weight.

can also be depictive

of a metal

So, what makes a coin a coin has to

be more than just its physical

attributes.

which makes the coin distinct

from the charm or the paper weight.

The distinction

lies in what it means

We must look toward that

to be a coin; the coin has a

meamng

which is distinct

from that of the charm or the paper

weight.

Thus, the coin's meaning is the perspective

be the thing that it is, a coin.
dependent
encompasses

upon its relationship

that guides it to

However, the coin's meaning is
to us; therefore,

what it means to us.

what a thing 1s

The truth of the coin is thereby

8
not just a truth of the com but also a truth of humanity.
Encountering
thinking

the coin in openness is experiencing

it physically

about what it means to us and what that meaning

about us.

Such encountering

approaching

says

is only possible if we refrain from

the coin as an object of utility.

its use value forces our directives
directing

Approaching

upon it thereby

the coin for

disabling

it from

us.

The open reg10n 1s then that place where we discover
thing's meaning
resides

and

in the context

in the experience

co-respondence
However,

which

of historical

of relatedness;

occurs

between

humankind.

Truth

the statement

reflects

ourselves

and the thing.

the

and the thing.

what things are is that which is presenced

region , the discoverer

the

in the open

What a thing is includes how it

relates to us and how we relate to it.

Therefore , the truth discovered

1s a truth of the thing and also a truth of ourselves.

The possibility

this open relatedness

calls freedom

and

depends

upon what Heidegger

of

attunement.
Heidegger

following

explains

freedom's

connection

with truth m the

passage:

Freedom, understood as letting beings be, is the fulfillment and
consumation of the essence of truth in the sense of the
disclosure of beings.
"Truth" is not a feature of correct
propositions which are asserted of an "object" by a human
"subject" and then "are valid" somewhere, in what sphere we
know not; rather, truth is disclosure of beings through which an
openness essentially unfolds [west].
All human comportment
and bearing are exposed in its open region.
Therefore man is
in the manner of ek-sistence. (Truth, 129)
Truth now becomes

the revelation

of what it means to exist.

Freedom is being able to look onto the interplay

between

things and

9

ourselves.

In the open reg10n , comportment

ourselves.

Freedom lets the thing be the thing that it is by

empowering

involves

the thing and

it to direct us, but the thing only exists as the thing that

it is in relation to us.

That is, the disclosure that we encounter when

we freely engage a thing in the openness of the open region 1s a
disclosure of the thing and of our own existence.
disclosure

However, the

depends upon the thing being free to stand opposed

as the

thing that it is and our being free to receive it as the thing that it is.

If we freely engage the thing, we experience
respond to that disclosure
reflection is disclosed

by reflecting

it in its meaning and

upon it.

a truth of our existence.

Through this
This truth of existence

is brought forth in light of the meaning of the thing.

In other words,

what the thing is tells a truth about our existence.
To be free means that we are open and responsive.
requires

that we not force our directives

of utility, systematizing,

mastering,

our directives upon the thing.

This

upon the thing.

Approaches

etc. are ways by which we force

By so doing, we miss the meaning of

the thing and neglect to reflect upon what that meaning

discloses.

Thus, we must bring ourselves into accord with the disclosure.
accord is what Heidegger
freedom, is an attuning.

refers to as attunement.

This

Letting beings be,

When we let beings be, we engage them

with a mind-set which brings us into accord with the disclosure.
Freedom allows us to engage openly and responsively;
a ttunemen

this is

t.

Letting

being

be, which is an attuning,

a bringing

into accord,

prevails throughout and anticipates all the open comportment
that flourishes in it. Man's comportment is brought into
definite accord throughout by the openedness of being as a
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whole. However, from the point of view of everyday
calculations and preoccupations this "as a whole" appears
incalculable and incomprehensible.
(Truth, 131 & 132)

to be

Hannah Arendt helps to clarify that this type of thinking
requires

the thinker to withdraw

perception

from the object of thought.

does not allow one to think of the being perceived,

this is what we are doing during a direct encounter
really

withdrawing

"serenity,

release,

'lets be'."
ourselves

from

that encounter.

from any form of willing.

then conceptually.

preconditioned

Willing

things

we must release

distancing

from the object, if not

This idea of distancing

entails

our positing

is motivated

is connected

predetermined

by a predetermined

necessary

for a debt forces our directives
distancing

and release

are unable to experience
utility.

Whenever

from willing

The result is our inability
unwillingness

to reflect

this approach

prevails

4

The
so we

other than an object of

itself to our particular

to encounter

If

purpose.

are not achieved,

the focus of our encounter

we force the thing to subordinate

and/or

the coin as

upon the com.

the coin as anything

we become

to

This occurs when our

we refer back to the example of the coin, approaching
payment

that

5

ends onto the encounter.

toward

then we are

Thinking thus entails

In order to attain such a disposition,

that of willing.

approach

4

for if

a state of relaxation , in brief, a disposition

Arendt seems to be suggesting
physically

Direct

with things ,
directive.

the thing as a whole and our

upon the disclosure.

Heidegger

with things which are familiar

suggests

that

to us.

Hannah Arendt, "Martin Heidegger at Eighty," in Heidegger and
Philosophy
Critical Essays , ed. by Michael Murray, (New Haven: Yale
University Press , 1978) pp . 299 and 300.
5
Ibid ., p. 303.

Modern
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Therefore, the less we know of a thing, the more readily we let it be
the thing that it is.

Heidegger explains in the following passage:

. . . where beings are not very familiar to man and are scarcely
and only roughly known by science, the openedness of beings
as a whole can prevail more essentially than it can where the
familiar and well known has become boundless, and nothing 1s
any longer able to withstand the business of knowing, since
technical mastery over things bears itself without limit.
Precisely in the leveling and planning of this omniscience, this
mere knowing, the openedness of beings gets flattened out into
the apparent nothingness of what is no longer even a matter of
indifference but rather is simply forgotten.(Truth,
131)
Since the coin is a familiar object of utility for us, the question
arises as to whether or not it is able to disclose truth.
discussion

of the Greek temple (Origin,

In his

168), Heidegger

it is possible for objects of utility to meet the conditions
for the disclosure of truth.

indicates

that

necessary

Certainly, the temple can be viewed for

its use value which lies in providing shelter for the gods and a place
in which to worship them.
ability to disclose truth.

Yet, Heidegger discusses the temple's

If there is a distinction

between the coin

and the temple, it may rest m the fact that the temple is no longer a
familiar

object of utility.

It seems reasonable to suggest that the

ancient Greeks did not experience
went to temple
directive.

because

a disclosure

they approached

of truth when they

with a predetermined

It is possible that the temple only discloses the Greek

epoch to us because we do not utilize it and are thereby able to
freely engage it.
issue , the preceding

Although Heidegger
passage indicates

to disclose truth because we ordinarily
We thereby force our directives

does not directly address this
that the coin may not be free
approach it for its use value.

onto the coin and fail to achieve the

12
necessary
familiar

distancing.

It , therefore , seems to be uncommon

objects of utility to disclose

Truth

involves

What is discovered

recogmzes

truth.

the thing being discovered

reveals

that their truth lies in their relatedness

that we participate
reflection.

The revelation

in the experience

Our willingness

the disclosure

through

to that existence
of truth requires

reception

and

of truth as is the thing we are encountering.

normally

frustrate

the event of truth.

do not engage things on this level.
Our everyday

one of examination , utility , or mastery .
to the revelation

of truth.

enables us to look onto our existence
to transcend

Things

to receive and to respond is as essential

however,

our everyday

approach

approach

because
toward

how readily

necessary

for truth , we need to examme

IS

Thus , we
toward things

in disclosing

IS

are

a thing which

works of art enable us
things.

Before

works of art hold fast to the condition s

are not successful

to

We ,

This is why artworks

An artwork

discussing

artworks

about ourselves.

in the context of human existence , so Heidegger

and not merely in their use value .

essential

and the discoverer.

is a truth of existence , a truth of what the thing

means and of what that meaning
only have meaning

for

why things other than
truth.

13

II. THING, EQUIPMENT, TECHNOLOGY

Things , equipment , and technology
observable

and functional

truth .

That

are able to reveal
we are able to make claims

IS ,

about their ob servable propertie s and their usefulness.
are not able to enter into a co-re sponding relationship
For Heidegger , something exists with meanmg .
thing is derived from its relationship
more than the properties

to us .

However , we
with them.

The meaning of the

So truth encompasses

of a thing; it includes that thing's meanmg

in the context of historical

humankind .

Therefore , the truth of a

thing is a truth about that thing and about ourselves.
Observing

alone cannot render meaning because it focuse s on

certain aspects of the thing thus excluding the rest of that which
makes the thing what it

IS.

experienced

as a whole .

equipment,

and technology

Consequently , the thing is not

Moreover , we tend to approach thing s,
with an eye on what each can do for us.

Such an approach does not consider the thing as a whole nor does it
reflect upon what the thing is as it exists.
approach

Instead , our common

toward things , equipment , and technology

domination.

is one of

We approach each with an eye on how we can control it

so that it may serve us .
equipment , and technology

As a result , we miss the meaning that thing s,
have in our existence , thereby

missmg

the truth about them and a truth about ourselves.
"The Origin of the Work of Art" addresses the reasons why
things and equipment

do not reveal truth .

the three leading interpretations

Heidegger

maintains

that

of the thing are an assault upon the

14
thing.(Origin,

160)

The first interpretation

bearer of traits (Origin,
from us.(Origin,
properties

157)

considers

155) and thereby keeps the thing too distant
This interpretation

of the thing , thereby removing

focuses only on the external
the thing from its context ,

If we employ our previous example of

its place m human existence.

the coin to this interpretation , we encounter
small , and flat.
thereby

objective

the thing as the

We experience

the coin as metal , round,

the coin in a purely observational

and

sense.

The second interpretation

explains

what is presented

to the senses (Origin,

too close to us.

This interpretation

the thing as the unity of
156), which brings the thing

results in a preoccupation

with

how the thing affects us in that specific encounter with it; thus , we as
individuals
encounter

become the sole standard of the thing's truth .
the coin as hard , smooth , and shiny.

coin in a purely sensational
explains

We now

We experience

and thereby subjective

the result of these two interpretations

sense.

the

Heidegger

in the following

passage:
In both interpretations the thing vanishes.
It is therefore
necessary to avoid the exaggerations of both. The thing itself
must be allowed to remain in its self-containment.
It must be
accepted in its own constancy.
This the third interpretation
seems to do, .... (Truth, 157)
The third interpretation

views the thing as formed

matter.(Origin , 157)

Although

this interpretation

their own constancy,

Heidegger

cautions that the fact that it has been

taken as self-evident

in modern investigation

encroachment

upon the thing-being

last interpretation

results

accepts

means that "it is an

of the thing . "(Origin,

in a preconditioning

things m

160)

This

of the expectations

of

15

the encounter

with the thing, thereby limiting

By this interpretation
commerce.
thereby

in a utilitarian

the coin purely through its use value and

sense.

rejection

of the leading interpretations

centers around their inability
1s.

to it.

we encounter the coin as a means of

We experience

Heidegger's

our receptivity

of the thing

to receive the thing as the thing that it

So , when Heidegger tells us that the three interpretations

thing and combinations
experience"

thereof

"preconceive

all immediate
(Origin , 160), he means

and thereby "shackle reflection"

that these interpretations
of the open region;
the disclosure

inhibit

us from entering

thus, the freedom

of truth is not achieved .

of the

into the openness

and attunement

necessary

for

Being present in the openness

requires that we listen to what the thing has to reveal and reflect
upon what we have heard.

The product of the thing's presentation

and our reflection

Thus , attaining truth from the thing

reqmres

is truth.

our engagmg

with its physical

properties

and the meaning

of its existence.
The problem 1s that we readily approach things with a
predetermined

objective,

thereby

failing

to bring ourselves

accord with all that they are as they exist.
inclined to impose our directives

We are even more

onto equipment.

equipment

is brought into existence

Therefore,

our approach toward equipment

what the equipment

Heidegger

explains

This is because

only to meet our specific needs .
is one of utility; we

encounter equipment when we need to use it.
encounter

into

As a result, we fail to

means m its usefulness.

that equipment

consists in controlling

and matter according to the purpose of the thing.(Origin,

157)

form
The

16
matter
use.

and form will vary depending
The equipmental

on the equipment's

quality of all equipment

intended

consists in its

usefulness.(Origin , 162)

The essential Being of equipment lies m its

reliability.(Origin,

The question is, how is truth attained

163)

through the piece of equipment?
resulted

The problem of distancing

from the first two interpretations

to equipment.

Equipment

or by way of use.

of the thing

can be approached

which

also applies

by way of observation

In the former, description,

explanation,

and report

set us too far from the equipment to enter into the disclosure of
truth. (Origin, 164)
equipment

Conversely,

disappears

The problem
on the equipment
things.

in utility the matter of the

into usefulness

and serviceability .(Origin,

with merely describing,
is the same problem

As we recall, that interpretation

Observation

equipment,

the thing from its

alone also focuses on the external aspects of the

thereby missing the meaning it has in our lives.

accomplished

intention
according

of

focused on the thing as the

freedom which is necessary for the revelation

approach.

and reporting

as the first interpretation

bearer of traits which resulted in removing
context.

explaining,

171)

because

we have already

of reporting

on it, our approach

to the information

of truth is not

determined

For example, if we approached

The

the mode of

the equipment

with the

would be prestructured

needed in the report.

Consequently,

we

are not free to engage the equipment nor reflect upon it , and it is
not free to present itself as the thing that it is.
on an electric wheelchair,
metal used to construct
its maximum

If we had to report

for example, we might look for the type of
it, the battery voltage necessary

speed, weight capacity,

etc..

to operate it,

However, this information

17
will not lead us to discover
this meaning

the meanmg

that the wheelchair

is as much a part of the wheelchair

has, but

as are its external

components.
Approaching
IS

similar

formed

equipment

for utility

results

to that of the third interpretation

matter.

purpose

which

which views the thing as

As with this interpretation,

predetermined

in a problem

utility

for the encounter.

Using

focuses

on our

the wheelchair

fails

to lead us to its truth because in our using the chair we forget its
composition.

That

IS,

we are focused on how well it accomplishes

purpose of moving us from place to place.
freedom

necessary

observation
it.

for the openness

and utilization

In addition

If the truth of the wheelchair

to limiting

of the open region,

of the equipment

neglect

its
the

both

to reflect

upon

rests in its being the thing that it is

as it exists then its truth is not just compositional

or functional;

it is

also meaningful.

of movement

and a

The wheelchair

sense of independence
is accomplished

for the person

through

user we are imposing

its structure

who needs it, and this meaning
and function.

and nonreflective;

whole of what the wheelchair
The two approaches
produce

means freedom

the same obstacle

therefore,

As observer
we miss the

is as it exists.

toward

equipment,

observation

and formed matter.

directives
direct us.
readily

The obstacle

upon the encounter
Of course,

instead

equipment

than do mere things.

predetermining,

and utility,

to truth as do the three interpretations

thing as the bearer of traits, the unity of what is presented
senses,

and

preconditioning,

of

to the

rests in our imposing

of allowing

the encounter

lends itself to subjective

This preoccupation
and prescribing

ends more

with
inhibits

to

the

18

freedom which is essential to the disclosure of truth.
peaks in the area of science and technology,
preoccupations

are easily heightened

Such a danger

where ordinary

to a preoccupation

with

mastering.
Harold Alderman

points out that Heidegger's

science and technology

is that they are not Being-oriented.

mistake is that we take control, thereby bringing
ourselves

and relating it and beings to ourselves.

projection
scientific

determines

problem

Our

Being before
Scientific

6

the manner in which facts must conform to the

investigation .

Such projection

serves to determine

of Being and force it into a definite realm of Being.7
experiments

with

are restricted

Since

imposed

directives , modern

science has come to depend on our confirmation

of the hypothesis ,

for we ourselves

determine

and the conformation.
procedures

explicitly

to humanly

a sphere

the conception

of fact, the experiment,

The institutionalization

of scientific

grants the power and authority

manage and objectify Being as an object of research.

officially
8

to

In the final

analysis we see that the objectivity of Being in science implies the
subjectivity

of human beings.

9

It is important to note that scientific thought is not being
attacked as such.
that is dangerous.

Rather, it is our fidelity to it as disclosing the truth
The measurable

but a part of their entirety.
6

and explicable

nature of beings is

The scientific approach and its findings

Harold Alderman, "Heidegger's Critique of Science and Technology,"
in
Heidegger and Modern Philosophy Critical Essays, ed . by Michael Murray (New
York: Yale University Press, 1978) p. 37 .
7
Ibid., p. 38.
8
Ibid., p. 40.
9
Ibid., p. 41.
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are valid only in so far as they are recognized
aspect of the whole.

When this is not the case, the freedom

necessary for the disclosure
accomplishes

for humanity

whole. "(Truth,

as revealing a limited

of truth is not accomplished
that distinctive

relatedness

and "only it

to being as a

129)

The scientist is blinded by his/her ability to fit the object of
his/her

investigation

neatly into an equation

that is within his/her

control

(i .e., posited

by him/her , calculated

by him/her , and resolved

by him/her).

Consequently , the scientist

the determination
disclosure

of Being.

attunement

with the disclosure

responsive

so that he/she

which an openness

essentially

of truth; he/she is not open and

might bring him/herself

Such human insistence

into accord with

sets the ground for

p. 135)

The scientific

method's

limitations

on truth are slightly

different from those of the thing and of equipment.
the difference

with

The scientist , as scientist, is not in

unfolds."(Truth , p. 129)

errancy.(Truth,

him/herself

This 1s a problem because "truth 1s

of beings through

the disclosure.

empowers

is that the scientific

The reason for

method explicitly

a given aspect of the scientific object.

concentrates

on

The problem is that science

accepts its truths as the truth of the totality of the scientific object.
The scientific

method

necessitates

the object under investigation,
have been predetermined
conditions

necessary

a preconditioned

and the directives

approach

of the approach

by the scientist , thus violating

for a proper encounter.

the

The freedom necessary

for the object to present itself as the thing that it is cannot be
established

.

toward

20
Likewise,
The scientist

the scientist 1s not free to be directed by the object.

is not in attunement

with the disclosure

because he/she is not of an open or reflective
the scientist
project,

projects

thereby

disabling

restricting

the scientist's

Since the scientist
him/herself
encounter,

conditions

the scientific

its totality

of measure,

approach

about this type of approach

object,

and preconditions

is exemplary

of the three leading interpretations

and

the object in its totality.

aspects of the scientific

as the standard

Rather,

onto the scientific

to reveal

ability to encounter

isolates

state of mind.

and limitations

its ability

of truth

establishes
the

of the inadequacies

of the thing.

Heidegger

toward things in the following

talks
passage:

... humanity replenishes its "world" on the basis of the latest
needs and aims, and fills out that world by means of proposing
and planning.
From these man then takes his standards,
forgetting being as a whole. .. . He is all the more mistaken the
more exclusively ha takes himself, as subject, to be the
standard for all beings.(Truth,
134 & 135)
Edward

Ballard

attempts

detailing

the scientific

method.

approach

reqmres

working

over the object is transformed

a "working

to clarify

the problem

He explains

objective

method,

object is reduced
evaluation

enables

over" of the object.

thus unveiling
to the directives

Through

by being removed

the scientist
objective

by

that the scientific

world in which it exists and by undergoing
The transformation

with science

imposed

to employ
nature.

this
from the

sensitization.1 o
a mathematically
Ultimately,

the

willed by the scientist. 11 The

of the object is incomplete

because

there is no

IO
Edward Ballard, "Heidegger's View and Evaluation of Nature and Natural
Science," in Heidegger And The Path Of Thinking, ed . by John Sallis
(Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1970) p. 42.
11
Ibid. , p. 43 .
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consideration

of the object as it exists as worked over.

scientific process falls out of perspective

Thus, the

in that it is not recognized

as a specified process but as a process which is capable of rendering
evaluation

of the totality.12

The problem is not just that we do not consider the object as
"worked over" by the scientific approach.

It is also that we never

consider the object before it is worked over.
the object means . to our existence.
to look onto itself.

Thus, we neglect what

The scientific approach also fails

In other words, the scientist does not reflect on

the object to discover what it means to the scientist or to humanity
as worked over.
vulnerability

The imposing nature of science along with its

to human directives

master of things.
truth because

empowers

This is problematic

revelation

requires

the scientist

as the

in regard to the disclosure of

freedom

to let the being reveal

itself and an open region in which the scientist and the object engage
m relatedness.

Both criteria

of the scientific method.

and the scientist be free to bring

into accord with those directives.

open and responsive

in this encounter.

that the scientist impose the directives

the scientific approach is technology.

of the encounter

Ibid.,

requires

and force

A logical outgrowth

Our desire to force our

onto things is never more tempted than in the area of

technology.

12

The scientist must be

Science, however,

the object into accord with those directives.

directives

by the mere nature

The open region requires that the object be

free to direct the encounter
him/herself

are overshadowed

pp. 44 and 45.

of

22
In "The Question Concerning
that the revealing
(Technology,

Technology"

that rules in technology

Heidegger

explains

is a challenging

296) , the chief characteristics

of things

of which are to regulate

and to secure.

Thus, objects come to be viewed as standing reserve,

things

further

awaiting

ordering and regulating
g1vmg directives,

ordering

for the technician

to the object

forces his directives

In technology,

The

onto the

we are unable to

the object as a whole because we come to pursue only that

which is revealed
basis (destining)
possibility

298)

of objects is in direct opposition

object through his ordering.
encounter

(enframing).(Technology,

in ordering
(Technology,

and derive all our standards
307), thus driving

of revealing.(Technology,

on this

out every other

309)

Man stands so decisively in attendance on the challenging-forth
of enframing that he does not grasp enframing as a claim, that
he fails to see himself as the one spoken to, and hence also fails
in every way to hear in what respect he ek-sists ..... Where .
enframing holds sway, regulating and securing of the standingreserve mark all revealing.
They no longer even let their own
fundamental characteristics
appear , namely, this revealing as
such. Thus the challenging-enframing
not only conceals a
former way of revealing, bringing-forth, but it conceals
revealing itself and with it that wherein unconcealment, i.e.,
truth, comes to pass. Enframing blocks the shining-forth and
holding sway of truth.(Technology, 308 & 309)
Heidegger
revelation

sees technology

of truth.

restricting

The problem with technology

the scientific

method because

the directives

of the encounter

predetermined

objective.

from willing our directives
free to direct us.

as inherently

technology

the

is similar to that of

also requires

that we set

and force the object to meet our

Truth, however,

requires

onto the encounter

The revelation

that we be free

so that the object is

of truth is not merely restricted

23
through technology,

but it 1s transformed.

The ordering and

regulating of things is not a truth present in them; it is wholly
posited onto them by our directives.
technology

requires

state of mind .

More specifically , the nature of

that we encounter

This disposition

re stricts any possible disclosure

truth except for the thing's utilitarian
neglect to recognize

things with a predisposed

value to us.

the controlling

Consequently , we

nature of technology

unable to enter into the openness of the open reg10n.
technology

heightens

this approach

strive for greater control
Harold Alderman
Heidegger
technology
challenging.

and are

The nature of

toward things by enticing

us to

over them.
attempts

to further

sees as inherent in technology.
is not responsive
13

of

explain

the danger that

He maintains

and contemplative

that

but domineering

and

In modern technology we posit ourselves as a being

over nature instead of a being within nature; there is no mode of
letting things be . 14

Technological

thought "provokes man to be the

being who makes nature yield its resources to him and which places
man in a position to be the provacateur
holds sovereignty
beings.

of nature."

Thus , technology

over beings and over all modes of uncovering

15

Through technology

we have come to focus on the efficient

cause, thereby viewing cause as that which makes or produces

an

Alderman , op . cit. , p. 44 .
Ibid ., p . 48 . Alderman illustrates by contrasting a motorboat with a
sailboat.
A motorboat uses energies to overcome the water.
The currents and
winds are seen as obstacles which must be surmounted . Motorboating attempts
to dominate the water.
In sailboating, however, one utilizes currents and
winds in order to move across the water.
The sailboat depends on the wind and
current , and this dependency is recognized.
Thus , the sailboat is a thing of the
water.(p . 49)
15
Ibid ., p. 49 .
13
14
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effect.

Consequently,

"man as the maker and producer

center of causality:

cause signifies

the instrumentality

Through technology

we have therefore

ends or means.

Technicians

which efficiently

achieve their goals.

means to further humanly

of the technician.

the determinant

of man."

come to view Being as either

choose ends and develop techniques

posited

doctrine of Being ultimately
purposes

occupies the

In turn, these ends become

directives.

subordinates
16

The technological

Being to the goals and

Thus, he/she positions

him/herself

as

of the nature of Being by viewing beings as nothing

more than materials waiting to be utilized as he/she wills.
danger in technology lies in our attitude towards it. 17

The

Through

technology we come to view things exclusively in terms of how we
can direct them to better serve us .

This attitude leads us to believe

that a thing's use value is all that the thing is.

The technological

object , like the scientific object, is not encountered

as a whole

because it is not allowed to direct the encounter, so its truth is not
revealed.

·

We seek to control
Things, equipment,

through manipulation

and technology

thus under our directives.

and through

readily fall into our service and

The result is a shadowing of the openness

of the open region necessary for the disclosure of truth .
shadowing

utility.

the thing, equipment , or technology

In this

is not allowed to

present itself as it exists but instead is viewed by way of our
subjective

16

17

ends.

Ibid ., p. 45.
Ibid ., pp . 47 and 48 .
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Heidegger

thinks that our everyday

equipment , and technology

reveals

approach

only objective

toward

things ,

or subjective

truths by focusing on how the thing appears to us, affects us, or
serves us.

Neither of these, however, is reflective of his

understanding
directives

of truth because they are ways in which we force our

onto the thing thereby

us as to what it is.
equipment,

inhibiting

the thing from directing

For example, when we encounter things,

or technology

in an examinatory

way , we are only able to

discover factual aspects of their being.

We are able to observe

construction,

and a multitude

objectified

size , material

consistency,

characteristics.

of other

The result is a failure to discover the

thing as it exists in our lives.
Similarly , when we encounter

things , equipment,

or technology

by way of utility , we are only able to discover the useful aspects of
each.

Truth is then measured by how well the thing, equipment,

technology

serves us in its functioning .

the former

objective

experience"

(Origin,

approach

This subjective

"preconceive

or

approach and

all immediate

160) which keeps us from entering into the

openness of the open region where things are free to direct us and
we are free to bring ourselves
Consequently,
encounter
involved

the disclosure

into accord with their directives .

of truth does not occur during our

with things, equipment,
in experiencing

or technology .

truth is displayed

. . . where beings are not very
and only roughly known by
as a whole can prevail more
familiar and well-known has
any longer able to withstand

The difficulty

in the following

passage:

familiar to man and are scarcely
science , the openedness of beings
essentially than it can where the
become boundless, and nothing 1s
the business of knowing , since

26
technical
131)

mastery

over things bears itself without

limit.(Truth ,

At the close of "The Question Concerning Technology " Heidegger
suggests that the techne of art is a single manifold revealing
yields to the holding sway and the safekeeping

of truth.

which

He asks ,

"Could it be that revealing lays claim to the arts most primally
...?(Technology,
question.
required
truth.

316)

"The Origin of the Work of Art " answers thi s

Art is able to accomplish
for the transcendence

which is essential

The work itself establishes

necessary for the disclosure.
truth, it preserves

it.

the freedom and attunement
to the revelation

the openness of the open region

Finally , art is not only able to disclose

of

27

III.

Our discussion
hold a privileged
Unlike

things,

THE WORK OF ART

thus far has lead us to the idea that works of art

position

equipment,

in the bringing
and technology,

the open region which is necessary
emerges

the Heideggerian

about of the event of truth.
the artwork

holds open

for the event of truth.

interpretation

Thus

of a work of art.

are those things which bring forth the event of truth.

Artworks

According

to

Heidegger , a work is only a work of art when it sets up a people's
historical

existence,

commonplace

routine

finds its essence
Heidegger
bestowing,

understands

poetry

to beings.

to the disclosure

Language

concluded
understands

from our
of truth, and

it is language

which first gives
world

This is why language is often related

are not assigned
18

that meaning , rather
as truth.

Poetry is

first brings forth the historical

of truth in the Heideggerian

meanings.

186)

of truth as

it and the earth by naming and

185 & 186)

that meanings

able to manifest

as the founding

and beginning.(Origin,

in the arts because

presencing.(Origin,

ourselves

in poetry.

of a people and preserves

explains

us to remove

and move into the disclosure

grounding,

privileged
presence

enables

Walter Biemel

to words; rather , words are

Our previous
than function,

For example,

sense.

discussions

have

is what Heidegger

when we approached

the com m

terms of utility, we found that only its use value, or function,
l8
Walter Biemel , "Poetry and Language
and Language, ed. by Joseph Kockelmans
Press, 1972) . p . 70.

as a

in Heidegger," in On Heidegger
(Evanston: Northwestern University
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coin was revealed.
commerce.
however,

Yet, the com 1s more than merely a means of

The possibility

of our encountering

depends upon our encountering

the truth of the coin ,

the coin m an open reg10n

where it is free to direct us and we are free to be directed.

In our

prev10us discussion of the coin, we found that we were unable to
encounter

the coin freely when we imposed our directives

of utility

upon it, because this approach brings us too close to the coin.
A.F. Lingis suggests that language gives birth to poetry and
technique by opening a region in which the clearing of Being is
brought

to light.

19

There exists a distance between the speaker and

that about which he/she speaks.
manifestation
world.

20

presences

The latter undergoes

through the discourse.

The discourse

a

is about the

However, Heidegger tells us that although language
the lighting of beings, this goes unnoticed in

language .(Origin, 186)
verbal discourse"

George Steiner helps to explain that "ordered

is unable

to overcome

Art, however, is able to overcome
to the core of things".
and achieves

realization

metaphysical

such constraints

constraints.

because it "pierces

Hence, in works of art truth comes into being
and self-possession.

21

Heidegger

explains

the need for art and its connection to poetry in the following passage:
The essence of art is poetry. The essence of poetry, in turn, is
the founding of truth. .. . Art lets truth originate.
Art, founding
preserving, is the spring that leaps to the truth of beings in the
work.(Origin, 186)

19

for
20
21

132.

A. F. Lingis, "On the Essence of Technique," in Heidegger and the Quest
Truth, ed. by Manfred S. Frings (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1968) p. 134.
Ibid., p. 136.
George Steiner, Martin
Heidegger (New York: The Viking Press, 1978) p.
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The shift
specifically

thus made from language to poetry, or more

IS

the poetic.

Greek sense of p01esis.
bringing-forth.

Heidegger

Heidegger

explains

unconcealment. "(Technology,

attunement
ends.

development

becomes

susceptible

to an evolutionary

and necessarily

hold

process.

The artwork , however, is captivating.

captures

his/her

truth and expresses

creative

Hence ,

It captures a
The artist

and guards it in and

production.
IS

part of what Heidegger

calls the workly character of the work.(Origin,
mastery,

The

by its use cannot be considered

The fact that an artwork is created

requires

freedom and

to utilitarian

of language often strays from its origin.

meanmg and enables it to endure through time.

through

world

and are thereby able to entice a

and the meaning conveyed

receptively

comes to

which draws us into a world other than our own.

Language is also susceptible

constant.

When the speaker's

on the other hand, essentially

fast to that which is presenced

a

comes into

the world of the object of the disclosure,

Artworks,

language

and presencing,

that "bringing-forth

concealed

293)

stray and language

perspective

the poetic in the

Poiesis refers to occasioning

pass only insofar as something

overshadows

understands

craftsmanship

or techne.

meanmg of techne in the following

178)

This creation

Heidegger

explains

the

passage:

The word techne denotes rather a mode of knowing.
To know
means to have seen, in the widest sense of seeing, which means
to apprehend what is present , as such. For Greek thought the
essence of knowing consists in aletheia, that is, in the revealing
of beings.
It supports and guides all comportment toward
beings. . . . to create is to let something emerge as a thing that
has been brought forth. The work's becoming a work is a way

30
m which truth becomes

180)

and happens.(Origin,

Heidegger

concludes that truth has to happen in such a thing as

something

created.(Origin,

180)

Walter Biemel explains that artists possess a kind of knowledge
which "looks toward something not yet present in such a way that it
makes it possible to give form to the work."
which distinguishes

the artist from the handworker

To bring Biemel's explanation
such knowledge
Jacques

and technician .22

a step further, the artist's possession

offers that Heidegger

rejects

artworks

in terms of matter and form because

An approach in terms of

representation

because

is also rejected

things operates

as a standard.

interpretation

1s reminiscent

technology.

The creative

technology

"the present-at-hand
"23

focuses on producing

fact, the objective
and technology

equipment

a thing of servicability

and

and
or utility,

of what is present.

In

which usually guides the creation of equipment

is how well the thing produced will meet our needs

or its utilitarian function.

The need for the thing is known but this

knowledge

does not necessitate

utilization

means.

22

of equipment

surrounding

neither of which requires the apprehension

of

Taminiaux's

of our discussion
process

being

these are concepts

which are adjusted to utensils.

everyday

of

is necessary but so too is the created product.

Taminaux

approached

It is this knowledge

a knowledge

of what its usability

or

Walter Biemel, "Elucidations of Heidegger's Lecture The Origin of Art
and the Destination of Thinking," in Reading
Heidegger
Commemorations,
ed .
by John Sallis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993) p. 372.
23
Jacques Taminiaux, "The Origin of The Origin of the Work of Art," in
Reading
Heidegger
Commemorations,
ed. by John Sallis (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1993) p. 402.
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According
substitutes

to Henri Birault, Heidegger,

idea of an operative

the "operative"

character

Heidegger's idea of techne.
reveals truth.

already existent.

ones.

techne produces

upon the

a thing which

necessary

for the disclosure

among matter and form and world and

Matter refers to the raw material which is

Form refers to structure,

of which are secondary

Birault's

to understanding

of truth is dependent

of the conditions

distinctions

thing are important

of truth. 24

The

The product of techne is a thing which

of certain conditions,

Birault's

character

of truth is essential

Since the disclosure

enables the fulfillment
of truth.

techne,

the duality of world and thing for matter and form.

issue is one concerning

fulfillment

in discussing

to the essential

shape, or construction,

characteristic

all

of techne,

which is the revelation of beings or the disclosure of truth.

The

thing , however, is that which is brought into presence by the creating
process of techne.

The produced thing is a thing which discloses

truth.
According to Heidegger,

creation, m relation to techne, is the

bringing forth of the strife between earth and world (Origin , 181),
and this strife is essential to the disclosure
Earth and world are difficult

concepts

of truth.(Origin,

to establish

177)

mainly because

Heidegger

does not understand

meanmg.

Yet, he neglects to establish explicitly how earth and world

are to be understood.

them in terms of their ordinary

Since both earth and world are crucial to a

thing being an artwork, we need to attempt to come to an
understanding
24

of what each refers to for Heidegger.

Henri Birault, "Thinking
and Language, ed . by Joseph
Press, 1973) p. 162.

and Poetizing in Heidegger," in On Heidegger
Kockelmans (Evanston: Northwestern University
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Heidegger

describes

earth as follows:

It [physis] illuminates also that on which and in which man
bases his dwelling. We call this ground the earth. What this
word says is not to be associated with the idea of a mass of
matter deposited somewhere, or with the merely astronomical
idea of planet. Earth is that whence the arising brings back and
shelters everything that arises as such. In the things that arise,
earth occurs essentially as the sheltering agent.(Origin, 169)
Upon the earth and in it, historical man grounds his dwelling in
the world.(Origin, 171)
R. Raj Singh interprets earth as the compamon to and ground of
the world.
in untruth,
world.

27

earth.
itself.

25

However, Joseph Smith describes earth as being rooted
a concealment,

a principle

opposing

earth is not merely a dwelling place; it is dwelling

Of course, earth is most easily understood

that comes from it.
reflect

26

He explains that we are of the earth and not merely on the

Therefore,
28

a withholding,

completely
Heidegger

as nature and all

However, none of these descriptions
Heidegger's

describes

understanding

seems to

of earth.

earth as that upon which and within which

we dwell; thus, earth seems to include nature and that which comes
from it.

Yet, Heidegger also says that it is that upon which we

ground our dwelling in the world.

In order for earth to provide a

ground for dwelling in the world, it must have a constant aspect, for
grounding

requires

a degree of stability,

That is, change is essential to nature.

25

but nature is fluctuating.
Consequently,

Heidegger must

R. Raj Singh, "Heidegger and the World in an Artwork," in The
of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol. 48 no. 3, Summer 1990, p. 220.
26
Joseph Smith, "In-the-World
and On-the-Earth:
A Heideggerian
Interpretation,"
in Heidegger and the Quest for Truth, ed. by Manfred
(Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1968) p. 191.
27
Ibid., p. 187.
28
Ibid., p. 200.

Journal

S. Frings

33
mean more than nature itself when he speaks of earth.

He hints at

the earth's constant aspect when he refers to the earth as the
"resolute
173)

foundation"

Earth thereby

upon which the world grounds itself.(Origin,
include s that stability

changes and our establishing
Heidegger
shelters.

also describes

through

which nature's

of a world are made possible.
earth as that which comes forth and

It seems that earth has the quality of presencing

sense of bringing forth into existence.

in the

Thus , part of what earth is

includes beings, but it must also include the Being which makes the
existence of beings possible.

The coming forth of Being and beings is

made possible by and constitutes

the earth.

The beings that emerge

shelter in the sense of covering and in the sense of protecting
Earth provides
world.

the possibility

Being.

for world yet has no meaning without

Earth and world are co-dependent

in that world needs the

grounding

of earth and earth need s the acknowledgement

Heidegger

explains in the following

of world .

passage:

The earth cannot dispense with the open region of the world if
it itself is to appear as earth in the liberated surge of its selfseclusion. The world in turn cannot soar out of the earth's sight
if , as the governing breadth and path of all essential destiny , it
is to ground itself on a resolute foundation.(Origin , 173)
For Heidegger , world provides
find meanmg .
relationship
Heidegger

the context within which things

A thing's meaning is determined

with it.
describes

This relationship

through our

is established

through world.

world as the following:

World is never an object that stands before us and can be seen .
World is the ever-nonobjective to which we are subject as long
as the paths of birth and death , blessing and curse keep us
transported into Being. Wherever those decisions of our

34

history that relate to our essential being are made, are taken
up and abandoned by us, go unrecognized and are rediscovered
by new inquiry, there the world worlds.(Origin, 170)
Joseph Smith interprets

world as not meaning

He claims that it is not our environment
world of substance or essence.
subject region of a particular

existential

living.

or nature, and it is not a

Also, world does not refer to the
individual.

29

If we accept what world

IS

not, assuming for now that we do , we must inquire as to what world
IS.

Joseph Kockelmans

dimension
possible

suggests that world is the existential

of humankind

through

which all relationships

and within which we encounter

of world seems to be reflective

beings.

of Heidegger's

30

become

This explanation

understanding.

The notion that world is a dimension is a helpful means of
understanding

world.

Heidegger

tells us that we dwell in the world,

so world must include the scope of our existence.

However, it is not

clear that existence is enough, for Heidegger says that objects do not
have a world and that world is nonobjective

in character.

Heidegger

tells us that the· peasant woman "has a world because she dwells in
the overtness of beings. "(Origin, 170)

Objects, however, do not seem

to dwell at all; they cannot establish relationships
Therefore,

or make decisions.

objects do not have a world but must rely on belonging to

our world, and how we see them depends on how they are revealed
in world.

Through our decision-making

and living, we give things a

context, a meamng, a world in which they can exist.

Thus, world

refers to the realm of existence in which human choices are made
possible
29
30

and establish

themselves.

Ibid., p. 185.
Kockelmans,
op. cit., p. 170.

World becomes essential

for the

35
disclosure

of truth because

relationship

between

the disclosure

ourselves

involves

and other

establishing

a

beings.

Smith suggests that the worlding of the world 1s one of disorder
and chaos. 31
making,

Although disorder and chaos may result from decision-

tension seems more accurately

the world.
evolution

of · world and between ourselves
or necessarily

and other beings.

chaos and disorder.

The
Sing more

points out that the world worlds in a distinct way during a

distinct historical
historically

era but that our relation with our world is

constant.32

If world creates

then that possibility
decisions

of

The tension exists between the stability of earth and the

result is not absolutely
accurately

to describe the worlding

or opens the possibility

for decision-making

must always exist, and as long as we make

through that possibility,

our world worlds.

The worlding of

the world is distinct in that different peoples at different eras of
history engage in living differently.
as well as a constant aspect .
individuals.

So, world has an evolving aspect

As peoples have worlds, so too do

For, it follows that if the criteria for the worlding of the

world is the grounding

of earth, the possibility

and the actual decisions of living, individuals
individuals

have distinct worlds.

interpretation

for deci~ion-making,

as well as groups of

It seems that part of Smith's

of what world is not is mistaken,

for world can refer to

the subject region of a particular

individual.

collective

and singular possibility

of world in his discussions

historical

world of the ancient Greeks set up by the Greek temple

31
32

Smith, op . cit., p. 186.
Sing, op. cit., p. 219 .

Heidegger hints at the
of the

36
(Origin,

169 & 170) and the world of the peasant woman set up m

the Van Gogh painting (Origin, 163).

By setting up a world, the

artwork

distances

things.

The work draws us into the world that it sets up , thus freeing

us to be directed.

us from our everyday

world in which we direct

As the worlding of the world evolves in the

context of world, so must the worlding
evolve within

the context

and against

of the individual's
the backdrop

world

of an historical

people.
The relationship
dependence.
world.

of earth and world is one of interplay

Our emergence

World is dependent

for and grounding
possible

on the earth instigates
upon human existence.

of existence

and activity,

once we arrive on the scene.
Although

and co-

the worlding

of

Earth is a source

but these are only

It is at that instant that the

worlding

of a world begins .

earth exists regardless

of our

presence,

it does so without being part of a world , without meanmg.

By setting up a world and setting forth the earth, the work of
art instigates

and accomplishes

this strife.(Origin,

the work holds the unconcealedness
177)

According

essential

to Heidegger,

to the disclosure

each struggles

to surmount

173)

of beings as a whole.(Origin,

strife between

of truth.(Origin,
the other.

earth and world is

177)

In a state of strife

In the strife between

and world each raises the other "into the self-assertion
essential

natures. "(Origin,

exists between

173)

earth and world.

By so doing,

of their

Strife refers to the tension
Things attempt

to emerge

things that they are as we attempt to force our directives
In our world, we succeed in directing
strife.

things,

earth

which
as the
onto them.

thus, eliminating

the

The work of art is able to bring forth the strife by setting up a

37
world in which we cannot actually force our directives
In doing this, the artwork distances
m a context.

onto things.

us from things yet places them

This distancing enables us to enter into an open region

where things are free to direct us and we are free to bring ourselves
into accord with those directives .
the conditions

necessary

Artworks

create

presences

for the disclosure

a medium

may freely reveal itself.

The artwork

through

which truth

In essence , a work , through its creation,

the disclosure

where the strife between

accomplishes

of truth.

(open region)

the truth of beings as they exist.

accomplishes

thereby

The creative process

of truth by establishing

earth and world occurs.

an open reg10n
The work itself

stands in openness and lights the strife, thus making it accessible
us.

Thus , Heidegger

work-being

maintains

that the two essential

features of the

of an artwork are the setting up of a world and the

setting forth of the earth; they are never separated.(Origin,
Artistic

creation

earth and world.
expressly

to

is the bringing

forth of the strife between

The work is the being brought forth which

brings forth the openness of beings.(Origin , 181)

the strife of earth and world happens,

lighting

Where

and concealing

apart thus opening a region for the conflict.(Origin,
explains lighting

172)

180)

move

Heidegger

as the following:

This open center is therefore not surrounded by beings; rather ,
the lighting center itself encircles all that is, . .. Beings can be as
beings only if they stand within and stand out within what is
lighted in this lighting.
Only this lighting grants and guarantees
to us humans passage to those beings that we ourselves are
not , and access to the being that we ourselves are. Thanks to
this lighting, beings are unconcealed in certain changing
degrees. And yet a being can be concealed, as well, only within
the sphere of what is lighted. Each being we encounter and

38
which encounters us keeps to this curious opposition of
presencing in that it always withholds itself at the same time m
a concealedness .(Origin , 175)
Lighting

happens

dissembling.

as the double

When presence

of refusal.

However,

when the being presents

the concealment

dissembling.(Origin

, 175 & 176)

"there".

itself as other than it

is in the form of
Unconcealment

Kockelmans

attempts

to clarify

is the happening

Heidegger's

This coming to pass is not dependent
in e-mitting

itself among beings.

the domain in which Being illuminates
Being therefore
it withdraws

of

thought

by

takes the initiative.

on us but on Being's
The "there" of Being 1s

beings as what they are.

Since Being itself is not a being,

itself as it reveals beings .

Hence, the only way in which

we can grasp Being itself is for us to understand
33

1s one

that as a process of truth, Being only comes to pass in a

spontaneity

Being.

and

176)

Joseph
suggesting

of refusal

only is known , the concealment

1s, as semblance,

truth.(Origin,

concealment

·

Being as non-

In relation to artwork, the work is the there, the place m

which things can direct us as to what they are.

At the same time, we

lose sight of the work itself being a thing.
George Steiner adds that the essence of "thereness"
meaning

which a work of art reveals is contained

is embodied

in the substance

externalized

or extracted

nature of a work of art.
articulate

33

and radiant

Simultaneously,

projection

Kockelmans , op . cit. , 175.

within the work.

of the thing and therefore

from the work.

and of

cannot be

This is the concealing
the work unconceals

of the manifestation

of Being.

by its
The

It

39
work conserve s Being and gives it a dwelling

and sanctuary- 34 The

eternal

hiddenness

strife within the work is one between

exhibition .

and

It occurs because of the absence of the actual object and
in the work .3s

its intense presence
Heidegger
experienced

tells us that concealment

refers to the not yet

domain of Being.(Truth , 133)

Kockelmans'

explanation

Thus understood,

of the nature of concealment

is acceptable.

If Being brings forth the being as it 1s then Being itself must give
way to that which is brought forth.
unconcealment
concealment

is sensible

Although

it is not certain that this 1s

means by concealment.

Greek statue of the god , Heidegger
god.(Origin , 170)

of

and con sistent with the double

of refusal and dissembling,

all that Heidegger

Steiner's explanation

When discussing

the

claims that the statue become s the

This claim does not recognize

a distinction

the work and the actual being of its subject matter.

between

The statue sets

up the world of the god and the people who worship him.

In so

doing , the statue embodies the truth of the god.

the statue

Although

and the god are not the same being , the · truth of each is the same.
The statue itself as a thing , a being , has no distinct meaning .

As a

work of art, its meaning as a thing gives way to the truth it
embodies.
adequate

Hence , Steiner's
than

34
35

of concealment

earth with concealment.

strife between

of concealment

is less

Kockelman's.

An explanation
associates

explanation

which should be avoided
C.D. Keyes offers that, in the

earth and world , truth expresses

Steiner , op . cit. , p. 134.
Ibid ., p. 135.

itself through

the

40
world-earth

dialectic.

concealment
dialectic,

In this dialectic earth's tendency 1s one of

and world's tendency is one of openness.

the work expresses

Through this

truth and allows truth to express

itself.36
Keyes' idea of the world-earth
associates

earth with concealment

dialectic is acceptable

and world with unconcealment.

Both earth and world are essential to the strife.
within the strife that instigates
established

until it

It is the tension

each to rise forth.

We have
If they cannot

that earth and world are co-dependent.

be separated yet truth is able to emerge from their union , it is a
mistake

to understand

unconcealment.

them in polarized

Heidegger

terms of concealment

cautions that "the world is not simply the

open region that corresponds

to lighting , and the earth is not simply

the closed region that corresponds

to concealment. "(Origin , 177)

Truth emerges from the strife between

earth and world ;

however , lighting and concealing are also m strife.
earth , as we have seen in our discussion
equipment,

and

by overshadowing

World can conceal

of technology

the earth aspect.

and

Likewise , earth can

conceal world , as we have seen in our discussion of the thing and
equipment , by overshadowing

the world aspect.

and world share in the lighting and concealing
to the event of truth (unconcealment ).
between lighting and concealing,
by disallowing

causes both lighting and concealing

36

Keye s, op . cit. , pp. 71 and 72.

and are both essential

By instigating

the strife

the artwork is able to disclose truth

either from overshadowing

as it does with earth and world .

Therefore , earth

the other.

Yet, the strife

to emerge, much in the same way
The work thereby brings about the

41

revelation

of the essence of a being (Origin, 178), where and how

world and earth interplay.
particular

attempts

it discloses truth.
envisioned

presentness
"ecstatic"

is "a disclosure

being, disclosing what and how it is."(Origin,

Steiner

IS

The unconcealment

to explain

the world/earth

164)

interplay

and how

He explains that in the artwork the world of beings

on more absolute and nonpragmatic
in things is nonutilitarian

authority.

presentness

of a

terms.

The

but has its own integral,

The mode of existentiality

fundamental

of things exists in and through a work of art.

of art is disinterested

creativity,

(wood, stone, pigment , etc.).

which is dependent

to the
The work

upon matter

In this sense, the world worlds in and

through works of art.3 7
Paul Schumacher
IS

more accurately

and Wayne Owens explain why the disclosure

described

as an event.

that the artwork is more accurately
object because something

Schumacher

described

new and significant

bear on the old and familiar.38 Through

maintains

as an event than as an
being brought to

IS

the artwork

"the individual,

society, and the aesthetic object are brought together in a way that
elucidates

existence" .39 The artwork

relationships
presencing,
concerns

among

expresses

beings.40 Owens describes

which is linked with emerging
"the historical

relations

between

beings and
the event as

and living.41 The event
things,

thoughts , and

Steiner, op . cit., p. 133.
Paul Schumacher, "Art for Existence's Sake : A Heideggerian Revision ,"
in Journal of Aesthetic Education, vol. 24 no . 2, Summer 1990, pp . 86 and 87.
39
Ibid., p. 84.
4o
Ibid ., p. 85.
41
Wayne Owens , "Heidegger's Philosophy of Art," m British Journal of
Aesthetics,
vol. 29 no . 2, Spring 1989, p. 132.
37

38

42

acts. "42

The artwork removes us from the ordinary expenence

view of things and into an extraordinary
things.43

Heidegger

experience

terms the characteristic

by Steiner , Schumacher,

or

or view of

of the work talked about

and Owens as displacement.

The work's ability to "cut all ties to human beings" enables the
work to transport us out of the realm of the ordinary.(Origin,

183)

The work cuts all ties to human beings in that it does not fall subject
to our directives.

The work's ability to direct us accomplishes

we have been referring
transporting

to as distancing .

us out of our ordinary

we Impose our directives
directed.

Heidegger

The work distances

encounter

what
us by

with things in which

and into a new encounter in which we are

explains

that:

To submit to this displacement means to transform our
accustomed ties to world and earth and henceforth to restrain
all usual doing and prizing , knowing and looking, in order to
stay within the truth that is happening in the work. Only the
restraint of this staying lets what is created be the work that it
is.(Origin, 183)
The artwork opens this possibility
Thus, openness
contained

occurs within and without the work, the openness

therein

and the work is therein

Owens explains
previously
interpreted.

and opens the truth of beings .

established

that displacement
standards

A new perspective

contained.

requires

on things is thereby

opens up a world that is not determined

Ibid ., p . 135.
Ibid., p . 137.
Ibid. , p . 131.

a release

of all

of the way things are seen and

Walter Biemel adds that the artwork transposes

42
43
44

IS

discovered.44

us into a world or

by the absolute

dominance

43
of our subjective
displacement

world.4s And Schumacher

is made possible

what we usually

because

do thus keeping

suggests

that

the work keeps us from doing

us within the happening

of the

work.46
These
Heidegger

three interpretations

are helpful

tells us that the work is able to transport

cuts all ties with human beings.
respondence

between

needs to exi , t.

ourselves

and the thing,

so some relationship

that to let the thing stand

to view the thing as something

of ourselves, yet related to us.

co-

that the thing be allowed to stand

We have concluded

as object means

us because it

Truth , however , requues

Truth also requires

opposed as object.
opposed

but need expans10n.

independent

So, a work of art's ability to cut all

ties with human beings can refer to its ability to repel our
inclinations

of incorporating

it into our world .

The work itself sets

up a world, and this is the place to which we are transported.
remain part of the encounter
instead,

we are directed.

our everyday

manner

experiencing

of things.

empowered

to disclose

our directives

things

By our transcending
its truth because

182)

from

and drawn into a new
our world, the work is

it disables

us from forcing

but instead forces us to let it

A thing is a work of art because it is

an uninterrupted

(self-subsistence).(Origin,

the work we are removed

of encountering

upon the disclosure,

able to maintain

45

but not as the giver of directives;

Through

guide us into the disclosure.

We

and steadfast
Therefore,

being what it is

it seems that the ability of

Biemel , "Elucidations of Heidegger 's Lecture
Destination
of Thinking ," op. cit., p. 381 .
46
Schumacher,
op. cit. , p. 85.

the Origin

of Art and the

44
a work to let beings be the things that they are despite
1s inherent

in all things which are works of art.

Heidegger
the happening
disclosed

our insistence

employs

Van Gogh's painting

of truth in an artwork .

by the painting

of shoes to illustrate

Heidegger

in the following

describes

the truth

passage:

From the dark opening of the worn insides of the shoes the
toilsome tread of the worker stares forth.
In the stiffly rugged
heaviness of the shoes there is the accumulated tenacity of her
slow trudge through the far-spreading
and ever-uniform
furrows of the field swept by a raw wind. On the leather lie
the dampness and richness of the soil. Under the soles slides
the loneliness of the fieldpath as evening falls. In the shoes
vibrates the silent call of the earth, its quiet gift of the ripening
grain and its unexplained self-refusal in the fallow desolation
of the wintry field.
This equipment is pervaded by
uncomplaining worry as to the certainty of bread, the worldless
joy of having once more withstood want, the trembling before
the impending childbed and shivering at the surrounding
menace of death.(Origin,
163)
C.D. Keyes draws a definition
discussion

of artwork from Heidegger's

of the Van Gogh painting.

Keyes, is an artwork

because

The painting , according

it is "a truthful

what the shoes are in their function";
The thing character

of the painting

takes a secondary

character.47

The work character

establishes

a world which Keyes defines

a functional-instrument
It seems reasonable

with this definition.
character
47
48

of the painting

Keyes, op . cit. , p. 68.
Ibid., p. 69.

position

to its

of the painting

as "the ontological

context m

11

is . 48

to assume

Although

that reveals

it reveals the Being of beings.

functional

which

disclosure

to

that Heidegger

the thing character

are essential

would

agree

and the work

to its ability to bring forth the

45
event of truth, it is · the event itself, our being transported
world where we are able to experience
with us, which enjoys first position.
discussion

things in their relationship

As we discovered in our

of truth, things have meanings

within the context of a world.

only because they exist

The painting establishes

existent and as existing in a context , a world.
and setting forth the earth, the painting
peasant shoes .

into a new

the shoes as

By setting up a world

unconceals

the truth of the

The work distances us from the everyday context of

the shoes, thus enabling us to let them be what they are, yet, draws
us into the world to which they belong, a new context, the world of
the peasant woman.

The result is the unconcealment

the shoes as they exist.

of the truth of

The painting projects an open region m

which we are able to transcend our world and enter into the world
set up in the painting.
This transcendence

frees us from forcing our directives

the shoes because they carry no actual utilitarian
encounter

the shoes without

focusing

onto

value for us.

on their external

how they affect us, or how they may be of use to us.

We

properties,

The shoes are

thereby free to direct us and we are free to bring ourselves into
accord with their directives.
experience

Thus disposed, we are able to

the event which occurs in the painting,

what the shoes

mean as they exist in the world of the peasant woman.
George Steiner explains that it is the actual presentation

of the

shoes by the painting that makes it possible for us to experience
innermost
knowledge

reality and meaning of the shoes.

the

The insightful

of the shoes granted by the painting is not attainable

by

46
scientific

or logical investigation. 49 Only art lets beings be.

"Only in

and through the painting does the pair of shoes achieve a total ,
autonomous
existential

being per se."
inscape

The painting preserves

and living presence

and guards the

of the shoes even after they

are no longer of scientific intere st or practical use.

The shoes are

familiar to us, but through the work of art they are distanced
their facticity

and drawn into the essential

from

truth of their being .so

Thus, through the painting we are able to transcend

our world

and in so doing we are able to view the shoes in a fresh light.
longer see them as equipment
painting

moves us beyond the use and definition

conveniences

establishes

use.

beings.

The

our needs and

have imposed and enables us to encounter

independent , self-existent

truth .

awaiting our immediate

We no

the shoes as

The painting itself is a thing which

and secures the conditions

necessary

for the disclosure

of

Through the painting the shoes are able to stand opposed as

the things that they are.
ourselves .

This distancing

The painting detaches the shoes from
of the shoes helps to achieve our freedom

to let them be the thing that they are by removing them from the
context of our world.

Since the painted shoes can be of no practical

use to us , we cannot approach them as equipment
directives.
them.

awaiting our

We are , therefore , unable to force our directives

upon

Consequently , we are free to be guided by their directives.

The meaning of the shoes is secured by the world which is set up in
the painting.

Through their meaning the shoes also disclose a truth

about the peasant woman as she exists in her world.
49
50

Steiner , op . cit., p. 133.
Ibid., p. 134.
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However, Meyer Schapiro points out that the shoes in the
painting are not the shoes of a peasant woman but are in fact Van
Gogh's shoes , the shoes of a town and city man .
that it is impossible

He further suggests

to say properly that the painting

essence of the peasant woman's shoes and her relation
work .s t
painting

Therefore , Heidegger's
itself but are grounded

Thus , Heidegger

has projected

associations

subjective

outlook .

Assuming he is correct , we
aspect of the shoes in the

woman can be universalized

interpretation.

to nature and

images into the painting .s2

must ask whether or not the individualized

Heidegger's

the

are not sustained by the

in Heidegger's

Schapiro raises a significant point.

world of the peasant

expresses

through

In other words, we are mqmnng

as to

whether or not the same truth of the shoes can emerge from their
existing in a different world.

If we interpret the world set up in the

painting as a world of a town and city man, we can conclude that the
pnmary

meaning that the shoes holds for him is the same as that

which they hold in the world of the peasant woman.

Heidegger

explain s the truth disclosed in the painting as follows:
The peasant woman wears her shoes in the field . Only here are
they what they are. They are all the more genuinely so, the
less the peasant woman thinks about the shoes while she is at
work , or looks at them at all , or is even aware of them . She
stands and walks in them. Thi s is how shoes actually serve. It
is in this process of the use of equipment that we must actually
162)
encounter the character of equipment.(Origin,
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Meyer Schapiro , "The Still Life as a Personal Object - A Note on
Heidegger and Van Gogh ," in The Reach of Mind , ed. by M.L. Simmel (New
York: Springer Publishing Company , 1968) p . 205 .
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Ibid ., p. 206 .
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The truth of the shoes rests in their usefulness.
explains

that the peasant

is how they serve.

Heidegger

woman stands and walks in them and that

The same is true of the town and city man, for

they mean the same to his existence as they do for that of the
peasant woman.

The city man also stands and walks in his shoes;

thus , they serve him in the same primary manner as they serve the
peasant woman.

All that Heidegger depicts in his imagery of the

peasant woman's world is easily adapted to the world of the city
man; yet, the meaning of the shoes remains the same.
back to the conditions
that reflection

necessary for the disclosure

is a necessary

condition.

If we refer

of truth , we find

Heidegger

indicates

the need

to reflect upon the painting in the following passage:
As long as we only imagine a pair of shoes in general, or simply
look at the empty, unused shoes as they merely stand there in
the picture, we shall never discover what the equipmental
being of the equipment in truth is. From Van Gogh's painting
we cannot even tell where these shoes stand. . .. And yet (Origin , 163)
Here Heidegger

IS

acknowledging

the need for reflection.

he realizes that the shoes alone are not disclosing truth.
truth occurs because through the painting
reg10n

IS

held open.

the openness

Even

The event of
of the open

We are thereby able to achieve attunement

with

the truth of the shoes because we are free to see them as something
more than a piece of equipment ready for our using.

Instead, we are

able to reflect on what the shoes mean because there is no possibility
of our using them; and their meaning is universal.
the truth of the piece of equipment
engage a truth about ourselves,

Thus, we engage

and through that truth we also

for the shoes only have meaning

because they are part of our world.

49
R. Raj Sing helps to explain that the painting does not only
reveal the earth and world of the peasant woman but also the earth
and world in general.
in revealing

Thus, the distinctive role of the painting "lies

the worldhood

of the world and the earthine ss of the

earth , and not merely a specific world and a specific earth.
seems that we have to accept this universal
world , for there needs to be something
and artwork in order for the audience
In relation

to Schapiro's

It

"53

aspect of earth and

common between
to understand

audience

the revelation .

charge , this means that the universal

aspect

of the shoes , what they are in relation to world, is the event of truth.
Thus , we are lead to the same conclusion that the localized
interpretation
universal

of the peasant

woman 's world assists in conveying

the

aspect.

The specifics of the localized

interpretation

do not seem

essential to the event which occurs in the painting , the truth of a pa1r
of shoes .

The question is whether or not it is necessary for the work

of art to disclose accurately the world in which the shoes belong , or
whether it is enough that it discloses the truth of the shoes in their
relation to us as equipment.

Although the answer is uncertain,

it

seems at least possible that the accurate disclosure of a world is not
essential to all works of art.

For example, the Greek temple disclo ses

the truth of the temple , and through its relationship

with the Greeks ,

its meaning for them; it also disclose s their historical epoch.

The

meaning of the temple depends on the world of the Greeks.

The

shoes, however , may maintain
that utilize them as equipment.
53

Sing , op. cit. , p. 216.

the same meaning

for different

worlds

Although the shoes may reveal a

50
truth about an historical
equipment

world , it is arguable that their truth as

is the same in different

Schapiro continues
interpretation

to charge that, even if Heidegger's

of the shoes was correct, it is a mistake to suppose

that the truth revealed
actual

worlds that utilize them.

shoes.54

in the painting

could not be attained from the

He also charges that Heidegger is mistaken when he

claims that the user of equipment

does not reflect on it and therefore

fails to encounter a truth about the world.
painting of his own shoes as an example.55

Schapiro cites Van Gogh's
Heidegger would agree

with this example.
For Heidegger,

art reqmres techne.

forth; it is also knowledge.

Techne 1s not just bringing

This is the gift of the artist.

The world of

the artist is to listen to the telling of truth and to bring it to stand .
The artist is able to experience
transported

from his world.

user of the equipment,
about the shoes.

truth without having to be

Moreover,

the peasant

Heidegger

woman , does know something

She knows of their reliability;

without noticing or reflecting.(Origin,
needed for encountering

admits that the

163)

and she knows of this

Reflection , however, is

meaning and all that it reveals.

Heidegger

says that the peasant woman's shoes are

genuinely

the equipment

In fact,

all the more

that they are "the less the peasant

woman

thinks about the shoes while she is working, or looks at them at all,
or is aware of them."(Origin,
regard to the observation
54
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162)

Heidegger would disagree with

of the thing.

Mere observation

keeps us

Schapiro, op . cit., p. 206.
Ibid., p. 207. Schapiro also offers Knut Hamsun's description of his own
shoes in his novel Hunger
to illustrate that the user does reflect on the thing .
However, the user in this example is also the artist; therefore, the argument
which applies to Van Gogh also applies here.
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too distant from the thing or fails to provoke
world of existence .
to unconcealment

and provokes

we force our directives

encounters.
encounter
disclosure

us to reflect , something

which is not

or use of the thing , mostly

onto the thing during these

It is possible for truth to be disclosed
of the shoes as long as the conditions
are met.

our

Art, however , avoids both of these hinderances

usually enticed by the mere observation
because

us to transcend

in the actual

necessary

for the

52

CONCLUSION

For Heidegger,

the disclosure

of truth depends upon the

conditions

of the encounter.

Approaching

things as objects

possessmg

certain traits, having particular

affects on us, or

performing

specific functions

for us inhibits

Since things find meaning through
must be able to encounter
things.

our expenencmg

our relationship

that relationship

truth .

with them, we

when we approach

In order to accomplish this, we must be able to look onto that

relationship.

This requires

distancing.

We must distance ourselves

from willing our directives onto things.

By allowing the thing to

direct us , we discover the meaning that the thing holds for us.

This

discovery discloses the truth of the thing, and by so doing , it also
discloses

a truth about ourselves.

Heidegger

recognizes

that our everyday

approach

things refuses to allow things to set the directives
everyday

approach

is, therefore,
things.

not attainable

because our

by our immediate

through

our ordinary

needs.

encounters

. Truth
with

Artworks, however, are things which are able to force

directives
things.

is predetermined

toward

onto us by removing
By establishing

the conditions

truth, we are able to experience
examination

us from our ordinary encounter

of Heidegger's

with

necessary for the disclosure

truth through works of art.

of

Our

thought has lead us to the conclusion

that

artworks are the only things that are able to disclose truth.
For Heidegger , an artwork captures
makes that truth accessible to us.

the truth of things and

We see things in a different light

53

when we view them through works of art.

Art almost allows us to

expenence

things for the first time ; at least , works of art allow us to

expenence

things m a new way.

are.

Art gives insight as to how things

We discover the truth of ourselves , how we live and interact m

relation to the things around us and in relation to each other.

A

work of art provides a window through which we can view our
existence
Heidegger

unhindered

by preoccupations

is reminiscent

with the directives

of the ancient world , a world which listened

to hear the truth of beings and lived within their dictates.
reminds us that we need to listen.
look toward

truth.

of will.

Art

It enables us to step back and

54
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